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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

WENDALYN ENCE, nka
WENDALYN SMITH,
Plaintiff /Appellant,
vs.
LARRY D. ENCE,

:

Defendant/Appellee.

Case No. 981707-CA

:
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Comes now the appellant to the above-captioned matter (hereinafter "wife"), by
and through counsel, and submits the following as her Reply Brief of Appellant herein:
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE TO CONCLUDE
THAT THE AMOUNT OF ALIMONY AWARDED IN THIS CASE IS
REASONABLE
Defendant/Appellee, Larry D. Ence, (hereinafter "husband"), contends that wife

has failed to marshall any evidence in support of the trial court's findings that husband's
need for alimony should be based on the parties' standard of living earned in 1987 and
that husband is unable to earn more than $12.00 per hour.
Wife respectfully submits that she has marshaled the evidence in support of her
contention that the evidence is inadequate to sustain the large alimony awarded in this
case. However, most of the trial court's findings regarding the issues of alimony are so
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inadequate that the Appellate Court cannot know how the trial court reached its decision
on the amount of alimony it awarded.
Since Findings of Facts are subject to a clearly erroneous standard of review, wife
must show the findings are against the clear weight of the evidence. Woodward v.
Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474, 477 (Utah App. 1991). A finding is clearly erroneous when, even
though there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court is left with the definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d 84 (Utah
App. 1989). The findings must be sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary
facts to clearly show the steps the trial court took to reach its conclusion on each factual
issue. Carlton v. Carlton, 756 P.2d 86, 89 (Utah App. 1988). In otherwords, there must
be a logical and legal basis for the ultimate conclusion which set forth the basic facts,
showing why that ultimate conclusion is justified. Smith v Smith, 726 P.2d 423, 426
(Utah 1986). If findings are inadequate, the broad deference owed to the trial court is no
longer guaranteed and there is no need to marshal the evidence. Woodward v. Fazzio, at
477. (holding that the conclusionary statements made by the trial court provided no
insight to the evidentiary basis for the trial courts decision, making appellate review
ineffective and there was no need to marshal the evidence when the findings were so
inadequate.
Even though the specific findings on the parties' income during eight years of the
marriage appear to be detailed and undisputed, there is no indication how the court
reached its ultimate decision to award $1,500.00 per month for four years and $800.00
per month for seventeen more years. This total amount of alimony awarded has no
discernable bases in the evidence other than the court believed it would give husband a
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standard of living based on the income earned by the parties in 1987, a "fair benchmark"
to establish the standard of living during the whole twenty-one years of marriage
(Finding of Fact #25). The critical question concerning the amount of income husband
will need each month is omitted. At a minimum, the court must establish need; it cannot
logically conclude husband needs the amount of alimony awarded without first
establishing what his needs are. This it failed to do. Even if the income earned in 1987
was somehow considered a fair benchmark of the parties' standard of living, there is no
insight to the evidentiary basis for the court's decision on the alimony award. It cannot
be assumed that the amount of alimony awarded is reasonable. A logical and legal basis
for the award is lacking.
The facts addressing the issue of alimony as stated in the Amended Findings of
Fact, numbers 16-24, do not provide a logical or legal basis for the alimony award, nor do
they show the steps the court took to reach its ultimate conclusion. The court recites the
facts from the testimony and exhibits at trial:
(#16) Since 1956, and throughout the parties' marriage, Respondent has
been employed full-time as a heavy equipment operator. Although his
salary fluctuated, Respondent earned as much as $18.52 per hour during the
parties' marriage. Petitioner supplemented the family income in secretarial
positions prior to entering school full-time. While the parties' children were
young, Petitioner was the primary care giver and also worked part-time at
home as a typist.
(# 17) In January 1981, Petitioner entered college at Glendale Community
College, later transferring to Grand Canyon University. After her first
semester of college Petitioner did not work outside of the home until she
graduated with her undergraduate degree in May of 1985. Petitioner's
undergraduate education was financed through two loans, totaling $6,000.00
and some scholarships. Petitioner paid off the loans in December, 1991
with post residency earnings.
(#18) From 1985-1987, Petitioner worked as an estimator for an industrial
trust company and as a substitute teacher. She earned approximately

3

$15,000 per year. In 1987 the parties earned $51,000 jointly. (Note: this is a
two year period since wife graduated from college in May 1985 and entered
medical school in June, 1987)
(#19) The parties lived in a mobile home until they purchased a small
home when their children were young. When the parties moved to Phoenix,
Arizona in 1980, they sold that home for approximately $32,000.00 and
purchased a single 14x70 mobile home. They lived together in the mobile
home until Petitioner moved with the children to Tucson, Arizona, in 1987
to attend medical school.
(#20) Petitioner was accepted into medical school at the University of
Arizona in Tucson in 1987. The parties purchased a home in Tucson and
Petitioner moved there with the two children. During the week Respondent
stayed in a travel trailer in phoenix and traveled home on weekends.
(#21) Petitioner borrowed approximately $49,000.00 in student loans to
finance her medical education, and contributed an average of $6,500.00 per
year from the loans to meet family expenses. The majority of family
expenses were paid by the Respondent's earnings, which were
approximately $18.52 per hour when Petitioner began medical school and
were $15.00 per hour when Petitioner graduated and the parties moved to
Ogden. The income history of the family during the Petitioner's time in
medical school is as follows: $41,000 in 1988, $36,000 in 1989, $36,000 in
1990, and $30,000 in 1991.
(#22) Petitioner graduated from medical school in May 1991 and the
parties moved to Ogden, Utah, to allow Petitioner to complete her internship
and residency requirements at McKay Dee Hospital. The parties rented a
home in Ogden for $745.00 per month. Respondent was unable to find
suitable employment in Utah and he then remained home to care for their
teenage children. The parties' earned $34,000 in 1992, $57,000 in 1993,
and $100,000 in 1994.
(#23) Until the parties' 1994 vacation in Alaska, vacations were infrequent
and were spent visiting relatives. They purchased moderately priced cars
and did not buy expensive clothing. The parties' major asset at the time of
trial was their home in Tucson, Arizona.
(#24) At the time of trial, Petitioner was living in the rented four bedroom
Ogden home and Respondent was renting a camp trailer from a cousin in St.
George, Utah for $500.00 per month. Although Respondent argued he was
unable to move into an apartment on his current income, the court
questioned that assertion.
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The findings state such facts as the work history and income of the parties during
the last eight years, where they lived, wife's contribution to the family's income when
she attended school and how their lifestyle was modest. (FOF #25) Some of these
findings, are specific, detailed and not disputed. However, the findings give no
indication how the court reached its ultimate decision on the alimony award or why it
decided to base the award on the standard of living earned in 1987. The court only found
that an award of alimony should allow husband to sustain a comparable standard of
living. (FOF #25) Nowhere do the findings specify how much income husband needs on
a monthly basis to sustain a comparable standard of living earned in 1987. The court's
findings of fact, therefore, are inadequate and conclusionary and do not clearly show the
steps the trial court took in arriving at the large alimony award.
The Amended Findings of Facts #26-29 may appear to justify the court's finding
that husband was limited to earning $12.00 per hour. The court noted that husband, 56
years old at the time of trial, worked as a heavy equipment operator sinceel956 and had
no formal education beyond high school. (FOF #26) The court found that husband gave
up his union position in Arizona when he moved to Utah and, since he was no longer able
to get his old job back or find similar union employment that he gave up when he moved
to Utah, that he was limited to earning $12.00 per hour or $2,080.00 gross and $1,600.00
net per month in St. George, Utah. (FOF #27) The court further found that husband's
age and skills limit him to a position as heavy equipment operator and make him unable
to produce income greater than $12.00 per hour. (FOF #28) Yet, in an obvious
contradiction, the court found " . . .but for the parties' move to Utah, Respondent would
be earning between $15 per hour, and $17 per hour, or $2,497 per month." (FOF #29)
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These findings are generally conclusionary, with no supporting facts showing
why husband was not able to find suitable employment in Arizona and why he was
limited to a job that would pay no more than $12 per hour other than that his age and
experience limited him. The court ignored the evidence showing husband's experience in
various jobs for a long period of time. We do not even know whether or not $12 per hour
was top union pay in Utah at the time. Furthermore, the court adjusted for inflation when
considering how much per hour husband would earn if he had stayed working in Arizona
but failed to make the same adjustment when it found that husband was limited to earning
$12 per hour in St. George, Utah. Was it even necessary to stay in Utah?
In Finding of Fact #30, the court thoroughly considered husbands retirement
benefits and awarded half to wife instead of awarding husband his full retirement benefits
to offset any award of alimony that may have been fair and equitable.
The court anticipated that husbands monthly expenses would remain relatively
constant even after his retirement and, therefore, it found it necessary to continue alimony
past his retirement to continue for 21 years. (FOF #30) This finding is also
conclusionary. There were no findings as to what husband's monthly expenses are or
will be; the finding that expenses will remain relatively constant even after his retirement
is pure speculation.
The court further found that the marriage was of long duration and that wife's
earning capacity has been greatly enhanced through the efforts of both spouses during the
marriage. (FOF #34) Even though the court found that wife earned her medical degree
through personal determination and sacrifice, it found that it could not ignore husband's
efforts to assist her. The court listed specific facts in support of husband's efforts such as
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providing the infrastructure that supported her in her accustomed lifestyle while she
attended school, paying for the bulk of the household expenses, including the payment on
the house in Tucson, enabling wife to spend increased time at the school and hospital by
hiring a nanny. (FOF #34a) The court further found that wife contributed less to the
family income during her schooling than she had previously, (FOF #34b), and wife and
the children lived in the family's home in Tucson while husband lived in a travel trailer
on his parent's property in Phoenix. (FOF #34c) There was no evidence that husband
supported two households as he contends, living on his parents property in a trailer.
Nowhere in the findings does the court consider the three and one-half years that
husband did not work while wife was the sole support of the family and husband not only
contribute less to the family income, he contributed nothing. Furthermore, the court
failed to consider wife's sacrifices during the time she was in medical school, when
husband stayed in Phoenix instead of helping her in Tucson where it was necessary to
hire a live-in first year medical student to care for the children.
The court found that a compensating adjustment was appropriate without
mentioning specific underlying facts in support of this finding including the amount it
was awarding. It found the intangible emotional support or encouragement provided to
wife, and the sacrifices husband made on wife's behalf, caused wife's earning capacity to
be greatly enhanced due to the efforts of both spouses during the marriage. (FOF #35-36)
Yet, while it found that joint efforts made wife's education possible, it emphasized that
clearly wife's achievement is due in large part to her own extended efforts. (FOF #39)
There is no way of knowing how it arrived at these findings.
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The award of alimony was necessary to restore husband to the standard of living
enjoyed during the marriage and to compensate him for his contribution to her increased
earning capacity; it would enable him to establish a level of housing and personal
property ownership that will allow him to maintain the lifestyle enjoyed by the parties
during the marriage. (FOF #40-41) Again, these findings are conclusionary for they do
not show how much income husband needs to restore him to an unspecified standard of
living.
II. WIFE IS NOT PRECLUDED FROM CHALLENGING THE FINDINGS
ABSENT ALLEDGED FRAUD OF THE COURT.
Husband argues that wife is precluded from challenging the findings of the trial
court apparently because wife drafted the findings adopted from the trial and included
therein no mention of the material allegation of fact raised at trial, and, therefore, is
deemed to have waived any objection to the failure of the trial court to make such a
finding. (Appellee's Brief P.16-17) Husband's argument is misplaced.
The trial court actually prepared the amended findings of fact in its decision after
remand from the Court of Appeals, which has been entered in the record. The Amended
Findings of Fact prepared by wife incorporates verbatim the language of the court.
Furthermore, and more importantly, the Utah Supreme Court has held that in a
proceeding in equity, such as in this case, failure to object to the trial court's findings of
fact is not fatal to appellant to appeal and the reviewing court is free to review both the
facts and the law as found and applied by the trial court. Dugan v. Jones, 724 P.2d 955
(Utah 1986).
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CONCLUSION
In light of the lack of evidence available to support the alimony award, this
reviewing court should conclude that the trial court erroneously determined that husband
was entitled to the amount of alimony awarded, if any. The present alimony award
represents a long term interest in wife's earning potential. Husband did not suffer
economic disadvantage by the divorce. Since the above findings of fact were the only
evidence supporting husband's need and ability to earn, this court should reverse and
remand for a dismissal of the alimony award.
Respectfully submitted this ^

day of July, 1999.

CAROLYN D. ^ E y / H E N
Attorney for Appellant,
Wendalyn Smith
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